Rational Philosophy

Last week I wrote about the long term risk posed by the Bush administration’s tame response to President Musharraf’s abrupt dismantling of Pakistan’s democratic apparatus. I framed the administration’s reluctance to come down hard on Musharraf in terms of political expediency. But as I read the NY Times recent interview with Musharraf, it occurred to me that Musharraf and Bush perhaps have a lot in common, and that maybe subconsciously (or consciously) Bush doesn’t want to take strong steps against Musharraf because he identifies with him. Not that we should take everything Bush says literally, but he has been quoted as referring to Musharraf as “my buddy and my friend.”

“The emergency is to ensure elections go in an undisturbed manner,” Musharraf says, which reminds me of Bush’s defense of domestic surveillance as necessary to maintain security.

“I know what [the Pakistan people] feel about the emergency when all these suicide bombings were taking place,” Musharraf commented on the increase in suicide bombings, “Their view is, Why have I done it so late.” Which recalls Bush’s insistence that the American people elected him and support his policy of invading Iraq.

The Times also reports that Musharraf defended his dismantling of the Supreme Court because the court had questioned the validity of his re-election. Similarly Bush has attempted, and in some cases
succeeded, in redefining standards for torture, or ignoring international conventions or protocols, because he doesn’t like the restrictions they place on him.

When we identify with someone, psychologically speaking, we connect characteristics they posses with similar characteristics that we attribute favorably to ourselves. Identification has served us well as a species. Identification induces empathy which helps us reach outside ourselves to help others. But identification also presents a particular danger that we need to guard against: With an excess of ego, we can wrongly perceive a characteristic that we possess as good, and, by extension identify and sympathize with that characteristic in others.

Bush seems to believe that his arrogance is justified. He knows better than the courts, he thinks, about what he should do and what is acceptable. He convinces himself that he is right to work outside or to twist the rule of law. If Bush were to condemn Musharraf for similar actions he would create dissonance in his view of himself.

Bush likes to perceive himself as popular and in tune with the people. Musharraf, the same. Outwardly, the trait they believe they possess is a feeling for the people; they like to view themselves as regular guys, men of the people. The true identification seems to be murkier. Perhaps they each recognize a similar weakness in the other, a desire to be liked and understood. It seems that they each feel defensive and inferior, feelings that bring with them a certain bravado (which brings us back to their arrogance).

Referring to the jailed the head of Pakistan’s Human Rights Commission, Asma Jahangir, Musharraf calls her “quite an unbalanced character.”

Interestingly, this comment reminds me of Rudy Giuliani and his now famous rant against the “crazy” owners of ferrets (going back to when he was Mayor of NY City).

Rudy Giuliani has said that he would not urge the Bush administration to cut off financial aid to the Musharraf government. “I would not second-guess any president on that because I think they’re in the middle of a very difficult situation right now,” Giuliani said to The Associated Press.

Perhaps Giuliani’s identifies with Musharraf, too. Something we should keep in mind as we move toward next year’s elections.

In an odd but apparently cleverly orchestrated sequence of events, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf has tightened his grip on his rule by dispensing with the Supreme Court and scrapping the constitution. This only a few weeks after the return to Pakistan of the self-exiled former leader Banazir Bhutto (whose jubilant welcome-home parade was marred by a deadly bomb attack). And only months after Musharraf promised to relinquish his military post if elected president.

Apart from the obvious questions about how these distressing events will affect the future of Pakistan and the region, they pose another question that calls upon the current US administration to decide whether it will denounce Musharraf’s dismantling of democracy, or whether it will decide that it needs a friend in Pakistan more than it needs to stand by the principles of global freedom.

Surprising some, Pat Robertson, the television evangelist and Christian Coalition founder, has endorsed Republican White House hopeful Rudy Giuliani for president. Roberston feels that Giuliani’s qualities as a leader outweigh his shortcomings as someone who supports abortion and gay rights.

And house Republicans have joined Democrats to overturn the President’s veto of the water resources development act, just one a several funding bills that seem set to pit Republicans against their leader.

To quote American Theologian Tryon Edwards “Compromise is but the sacrifice of one right or good in the hope of retaining another - too often ending in the loss of both.” But is this the case? What is the philosophy of compromise?

If Bush continues to court Musharraf’s favor by going easy on him in the face of his anti-democratic measures he will discredit the very ideal he says he seeks to promote — global democracy. Now, there are some who think (I’m one of them) that Bush may even believe that he supports global democracy, when what he really wants is to feel safer and to make his friends and allies wealthier. In which case, compromise would seem to be the most attractive strategy; a slap on the wrist for Musharraf so that America can continue to rely on his support.

Reading Pat Robertson’s comments, his goal in compromise seems to be that he hopes to have a strong leader in the White House, one sympathetic to a broad swath of Christian concerns, even if not all of them.

And house Republicans seek to approve funding they feel their constituents support, even if it weakens the overall coherence of their party and its goals. The long term result of which may be that they hurt Republican chances in the next election and thereby risk not getting what their constituents want in the long term.

From a purely conceptual perspective, Tryon Edwards definition of compromise seems quite good: “the sacrifice of one right or good in the hope of retaining another.” But what Edwards’ sobering analysis doesn’t account for is whether, if one were not to compromise, one would forgo a greater right or good. What’s the alternative? in other words.

Therefore, in considering any specific instance of a compromise, we need to evaluate three things:

1. What do we give up by the compromise?
2. What do we gain by the compromise?
3. What options do we have if we don’t compromise?

Bush’s task at hand will be made more difficult if he denounces Musharraf’s actions and isolates Pakistan. But it won’t be made impossible. From a practical perspective, even without Pakistan’s support Bush can continue to fight the war on terror, albeit less adeptly (if that’s the right word). As a matter of principle, not denouncing Musharraf’s actions would undermine Bush’s declared objectives and make a further global mockery of his rhetoric of freedom.

It’s hard to know what Robertson expects to gain from his endorsment of Giuliani, and it’s hard to imagine that he will lose a great deal by endorsing him, but he did have alternatives (McCain, for instance) who would have provided a safer bet. Perhaps then his endorsement of Giuliani reflects a more principled choice than it might first appear. Perhaps he really does believe that Giuliani will make a strong leader and that this is more important than having a president who doesn’t support abortion and gay rights.

And for the house Republicans, voting with the president would have meant voting, symbolically at least, in favor of fiscal responsibility. This would have been a greater good, perhaps, than achieving some short-lived favor with their constituents. But perhaps the chance to distance themselves from Bush was just too appealing to pass up.

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It’s interesting watching Giuliani run for president. While living in New York for the past fifteen years I’ve had some awareness of Giuliani and his perspectives. I feel as though I know him to some extent. His appearance before the National Rifle Association (the NRA) last week was fascinating. In an attempt to try to secure the NRA’s endorsment he felt obliged to defend his mayoral record of criticism of the NRA and his steadfast lobbying over that period for stricter gun control.

We all change our minds. It is important and inevitable for rational thinkers to revise and amend their thinking in the light of deeper or broader understanding. Often, politicians seem not to be permitted this right. And often politicians don’t try to exercise it, choosing instead to spin their ‘beliefs’ to best negotiate the current political waters.

Here is what Giuliani said to the NRA:

“At the time, what I was doing during the time that I was mayor was taking advantage of every law and every interpretation of every law that I could think of to reduce crime.”

On the face of it, there seems no reason to question that this is correct. It seems completely in accord with Giuliani’s recor. It also seems to concord with his declared intention at the time — to reduce crime and make New York a safer place.

But what is Giuliani’s intention now? And how do we interpret, philosophically, his shift in stance on gun control?

I’m not trying to think this through in order to lambast Giuliani. I know I, too, change my mind and wonder whether I’m doing so to suit my own ends. What seems to be important is to ask the question.

Giuliani’s priorities have changed. He is no longer the mayor of New York City. Therefore he has a new perspective. His goal in speaking to the NRA to further his political ambitions. But the critical question seems to be this: Did he intend to further his political ambitions by forging an allegiance with a powerful conservative group, or did he intend to further his political ambitions by speaking his mind and presenting his revised perspective on the importance and scope of gun control?

It is easy to jump to the first conclusion. I did when I first heard about Giuliani’s address. And then when watching clips of Giuliani’s address he seems sincere and thoughtful. Parsing the language of his U-turn we find that he sounds reasonable. He’s changed his mind, we think.

But if we parse his statements in a different way, if we look for Giuliani’s approach to arriving at rational convictions, statements and acts, we can draw a disturbing conclusion. What Giuliani declares is that he was using every means possible to make New York a safer place. He exorts this approach in his speech to the NRA saying that he used the same strategy in every aspect of his mayorship. Giuliani sees nothing wrong in this. He was trained to do this. He was, by all accounts, a very successful prosecutor of the cases that he prosecuted (although he was criticized for dropping the ones he didn’t feel confident about).

Giuliani’s philosophy, it seems, and by his own declaration, is one of exigency. I do what I do in order to achieve the result I want to achieve. Since the result is desirable, my actions are justified.

This philosophy is excellent so long as one has goals that are noble and altruistic. But a person who holds this philosophy is unlikely to consistently hold noble and altruistic goals because they are accustomed to setting goals based on need or desire.

An anecdote that will be familiar to all of those who lived through Giuliani’s mayorship. Giuliani had a dislike of ferrets. He pursued this dislike with all of the tenacity that he pursued everything else. He banned the keeping of ferrets as pets. Can a man who will issue laws against small mammals in the midst of a crackdown on crime in one of the world’s biggest cities really be expected to keep a perspective on the demand for exigency?